– A –

Regarding compatibilist freedom…My understanding of this is that we willingly choose from a God-directed will – whether for good or evil, depending on whether he has hardened or enlightened us. Is there anything in this that you would consider incorrect/unbiblical?

I agree with what you wrote, but contrary to many Calvinists, I disagree that this should be called “freedom” in any relevant sense.

When speaking of freedom in our context, I always speak of freedom in relation to God – and that is why the issue becomes clear. I can consistently use the same definition whether I am dealing with the nature of God, the decree of God, the nature of man, the nature of salvation, or determinism from a philosophical perspective.

Many Calvinists do not speak this way; rather, they say that we always choose what we most desire,[1] but when they add that this is “freedom” in a relevant sense, and that we are responsible based on this “freedom,” then I disagree. Instead, I deny any sense of human freedom and deny any relationship between freedom and responsibility.

Moral responsibility (or accountability) has to do with whether God has decided to judge us; it has no direct relationship with whether we are free. In fact, if we were free from God but not judged by God, then we would still not be morally responsible (or accountable). In other words, moral responsibility does not presuppose human freedom, but it presupposes divine sovereignty. We are responsible not because we are free, but we are responsible precisely because we are not free.

Also, Calvinists often affirm that Adam was free before the Fall. But again, I always speak of freedom relative to God, and from this perspective, I would say that Adam had no freedom even before the Fall. To be “free” from sin is irrelevant. The issue is whether Adam was free from God to choose to remain free from sin – he was not. In addition, I would not say that God permitted Adam to fall, but that God caused it. Many Calvinists would also disagree with me on this.

Compatibilists would most likely refuse to say that we are free from God, but they would insist that since we always act according to the strongest desire of the moment, that this is a real sense of freedom, and that this “freedom” is the precondition for moral responsibility.

Suppose that I have committed a murder. I was indeed free from other creatures when I made my decision, and I acted according to my own desire. But this desire was caused and controlled by God, and the fact that I would always act on my strongest desire (which is human nature) was also caused by God. This amounts to saying that we have no freedom from God to abstain from murder, but that we only have an internal freedom from other creatures to abstain from murder.

If we were to soften this and say that our desires are somehow not determined but merely permitted by God, then, even overlooking the fact that this is unbiblical, we must still explain how it is possible for God to permit something without causing it, and still immutably decree it to happen in a sense that is not merely an expression of prescience. If we cannot, then we are Arminians.

Also, if God merely permits us to do something, then I would also demand a metaphysical explanation on how it is possible for a creature to direct and control its own mind. Is it possible for a created thing to function at all under God’s bare permission (if there is such a thing) without his constant causative determination? How?

Calvin wrote, “Indeed, not even an abundance of bread would benefit us in the slightest unless it were divinely turned into nourishment.” This sounds like my occasionalism. There is no inherent “nature” or power in bread that always works with the body to provide nourishment, but it must be “divinely turned into nourishment” each time it is consumed. If Calvin was a Calvinist, or if Calvin was himself, then this is the true Calvinism.

My position is a consistent application of divine sovereignty over everything. It is a denial of any form of dualism or deism. I affirm that God controls everything about everything that is anything, including every aspect of every detail of every human decision and action, in such a way that man has no freedom in any meaningful or relevant sense.

Libertarian freedom is indeed freedom, but it is unbiblical and impossible – there is no such freedom. On the other hand, compatibilist freedom is not “freedom” at all, but it is only a description of what happens when God controls every aspect of our decisions and actions, usually according to a “nature” that he has also created in us. Both the words “compatibilist” and “freedom” are misleading.

– B –

I would consider myself a “Calvinistic” Baptist. According to my understanding, sin entered this world through the disobedience of Adam and not as a result of the determining purpose of God.

Actually, all Calvinists would affirm that sin came as a result of God’s decree, so that it was determined at least in this sense. The difference is that many of them say that this is a “passive” or “permissive” decree, whereas my position is that there is no such thing as a “passive” or a “permissive” decree with God, that it is unbiblical and impossible for a divine decree to be “passive” or “permissive.”

It is correct to say that sin came through the disobedience of Adam, but this is not the debated issue. The issue is what caused this disobedience. To say that before the Fall Adam had “free will” is irrelevant unless by this “free will” is meant freedom from God. If this is what is meant, then this is Paganism, not Calvinism. If only freedom from sin is meant, then again this is irrelevant, since the relevant question in discussing divine determinism is whether Adam was free from God to abstain from sin, not whether he was free from sin to abstain from sin.

[1] Although they might also acknowledge that it is God who determines this desire, unlike me, they might deny that God always actively and directly causes our desires, whether good or evil.